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Operation Pleshet (, ''Mivtza Pleshet'', lit. "Operation Philistia"), named after the geographical region where it took place, was an Israeli military operation during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. It was carried out from May 29 to June 3, 1948, in the Isdud/Ad Halom area of the southern front, against the Egyptian Army. The aim of the operation was to capture Isdud and stop the Egyptian advance northwards. While only the June 2–3 engagements are officially named Operation Pleshet, the events immediately preceding are historiographically joined with it. The preceding events consisted of an aerial bombardment, followed by small-scale Israeli harassment of the Egyptian lines, and later a ground assault (Operation Pleshet). The original plan was to attack on June 1–2, but this was canceled due to an impending ceasefire, and re-attempted on June 2–3. The Israelis, under the Givati Brigade's umbrella command, attacked in two main forces: one from the north (3 companies) and one from the south (4 reinforced companies). The Israelis had little intelligence on their enemy and were forced to retreat. They failed to capture territory, and suffered heavy casualties. However, following the operation, Egypt changed its strategy from offensive to defensive, thus halting their advance northwards. Two unsettled historiographic debates exist revolving around the operation: whether the Egyptians were intending to advance toward Tel Aviv, which most historians agree was not the case; and whether the operation was a turning point on the Israeli southern front. Traditional Israeli historiography, supported by early Arab accounts, maintains that it was a turning point, while later Arab sources, and New Historians, dispute this. ==Background== Prior to the founding of the State of Israel, the Yishuv leadership anticipated an attack by regular Arab armies, of which Egypt's was the strongest in terms of manpower, arms and equipment.〔 As such, Plan Dalet took stopping a potential Egyptian attack into account, and the Ad Halom (Sukrir) dual bridge over the Lakhish River was blown up as part of Operation Barak on May 12.〔 In the eyes of the Givati command, this part of the operation was of marginal importance. A platoon from the 54th Battalion, two mules and 300 kilograms of explosives were allocated for it. The mules fled the scene, and the explosives were divided among the soldiers, who delivered them to the bridge. It took two attempts to destroy it, as some of the explosives did not work the first time.〔 The original bridge was built over the Lakhish River (Wadi Sukrir/Wadi Fakhira) during the Roman period, and re-built by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century. A parallel railway bridge was added when the coastal railway (Lebanon–Egypt) was laid. After numerous armed raids in the area during the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, the British authorities set up a series of pillboxes in the area, one of them next to the bridges.〔 Egypt invaded the newly declared State of Israel on May 15, 1948. Their strength was approximately one division, commanded by Major General Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi. Their advance was three-pronged: The main column moved north through what is today the Gaza Strip and attacked Kfar Darom, another column went east toward Beersheba, and a third attacked kibbutz Nirim. On May 17, a small force split off from Beersheba to link up with more Egyptian forces at Auja al-Hafir, on May 19 the main column attacked Yad Mordechai, and on May 20, the main force in Beersheba set out to link with the Jordanian Arab Legion in Hebron.〔 On May 21, Cairo sent an urgent message to its units in Palestine, saying "we want al-Majdal today".〔 Following the Israeli Operation Bin Nun, on May 25, the Jordanian Arab Legion pressured the Egyptians to move northwards to the Ramla–Aqir–Yibna area, in order to connect later with the legion at Bab al-Wad. Doing so would divide the Israeli forces into two—the Negev, and the rest of Israel. The Egyptian commander al-Mwawi, was opposed to such a move, but the leadership in Cairo dismissed his worries, and on May 28 ordered a quarter of his total combat forces to move north from Majdal.〔 Gamal Abdel Nasser wrote in his memoirs that already by May 25, the Egyptian forces were spread so thin that they had no mobile reserves to assault a Jewish force, and considered it strange that they would be ordered to allocate a major contingent to fight in an unfamiliar area.〔 Following-up his victory in the Battle of Yad Mordechai on May 23–24, al-Mwawi pushed north along the coast, bypassing the relatively well-defended Israeli village of Nitzanim. His column was reinforced by sea near Majdal, where he sent part of his force to the Majdal–Hebron road, hoping it would be able to link with another column, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Abd el-Aziz, south of Jerusalem. Reduced to about 2,500 men, al-Mwawi resumed his march northwards.〔 Brigadier General Muhammad Naguib was put in charge of the column by al-Mwawi, because the original commander was on vacation in Egypt.〔 On the afternoon of May 29, 1948, the observation post in Nitzanim spotted an Egyptian column, including tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery moving north up the coastal road.〔 The figure it reported at 16:45 was about 1,300 vehicles, although Yehoshua Goldrat, the operations officer of the Givati Brigade, being familiar with Egyptian formations, estimated that it was a brigade with about 500 vehicles.〔 Estimates from the General Staff stood at 200 vehicles and 2,000–3,000 soldiers.〔 At the time, the Israeli decision makers did not know where the Egyptians were headed. They envisioned one of three possibilities: A march on Tel Aviv, about northwards—the view adopted by David Ben-Gurion; an attempt to connect to the Transjordanian Arab Legion in the Hebron area and capture the Negev—proposed by Nahum Sarig of the Negev Brigade; or an attempt to connect with the remaining Arab forces in Lydda and Ramla.〔〔 The IDF command did not see the forces in the western Negev as sufficient to fully stop an Egyptian invasion, wherever it was headed, and ordered an operation to stop or delay the advancing column.〔 The command also feared that the Arab forces would try to create facts on the ground before the impending UN-imposed ceasefire. The two Arab forces that were considered a threat were the Iraqis in the Triangle (Jenin–Nablus–Tulkarm) and the Egyptians at Majdal–Isdud. Thus, Golani and Carmeli were to attack Jenin, Alexandroni was to harass Tulkarm, and Givati was to attack Isdud.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Pleshet」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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